In EnglishThe documents worked out at joint sessions of the Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate on a dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad on negotiations with the Moscow Patriarchate1. On the Joint Work of the Commissions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia2. On the Attitude of the Orthodox Church towards the Heterodox and Towards Inter-Confessional Organizations3. On the Relationship between the Church and State4. Commentary on the Joint Document of the Commissions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia Entitled "On the Relations Between Church and State"
En français:
L'Eglise orthodoxe russe préoccupée par l'avenir de la Russie
Auf Deutsch:
Bischof von Wien und Österreich Hilarion: Die Orthodoxie vor der Herausforderung des militanten Säkularismus
Letters to the editor
The documents worked out at joint sessions of the Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate on a dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad on negotiations with the Moscow Patriarchate
In accordance with the reached agreement confirmed by the resolutions of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (on April 20, 2005) and the Hierarchical Synod Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (on May 23, 2005) below there are the four documents jointly worked out by the Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate on a dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad on negotiations with the Moscow Patriarchate and approved by the Hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.
The work of the Commission is being continued.
1. On the Joint Work of the Commissions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia
Based upon our common Orthodox belief in our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ and upon our faithfulness to the common canonical Tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church, and acting in accordance with the instructions formulated over the course of the discussions held under the chairmanship of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy of Moscow and All Russia in Moscow on May 17-18, 2004, during the visit of the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia led by His Eminence Metropolitan Laurus of Eastern America and New York, the Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate on discussions with the Russian Church Abroad and the Commission of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia on discussions with the Moscow Patriarchate, during joint meetings held in Moscow (June 22-24 and November 17-19, 2004), in Munich (September 14-16, 2004) and in Paris (March 2-4, 2005), prepared a series of draft documents subsequently approved by the Hierarchies of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.
The statements "On the Relationship of the Church and State" and "On the Attitude of the Orthodox Church Towards the Heterodox and Inter-Confessional Organizations" reflect the common understanding of these questions of principle by both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.
The drafted "Act on Canonical Communion" determines the canonical status of the historically-formed assemblage of the dioceses, parishes, monasteries, brotherhoods and institutions of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia as an inalienable, self-governing part of the Russian Orthodox Church, based on grounds similar to those foreseen by the Statutes ("Ustav") of the Russian Orthodox Church as they apply to Self-Governing Churches on the territory of the Moscow Patriarchate. Upon the enactment of this proposed Act, the fullness of canonical communion within a single Pomestny [Local] Russian Orthodox Church, headed by His Holiness Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, shall be restored.
According to the draft, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia is independent in pastoral, educational, administrative, management, property and civil matters. The supreme authority within the Russian Church Abroad is manifested in her Sobor [Council] of Bishops, convened by her President (the First Hierarch) on the basis of the "Regulations of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia." In accordance with the canonical order of the Orthodox Church, decisions falling outside the competency of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia are made in concord with the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. The highest instance of ecclesiastical authority are the Pomestny [Local] and Bishops' Councils of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose decisions, as well as the decisions of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, have force in the Russian Church Abroad, taking into account the particularities determined by the "Act on Canonical Communion," the "Regulations of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia" and the laws of the nations in which it conducts its service. The bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia are members of the Pomestny and Bishops' Councils of the Russian Orthodox Church and participate in the established order at meetings of the Holy Synod. The Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia receives its holy myrrh from the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia.
In accordance with the Act on Canonical Communion, certain additions and amendments must be entered into Chapter VII of the Statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church ("Self-Governing Churches"), and also into the Regulations of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.
The Commissions of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia also examined the question of how to view the many official declarations, decisions, epistles and other such documents issued by the First Hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, and also by the organs of ecclesiastical authority in the fatherland and abroad over the course of the decades during which canonical communion between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia was absent. Some of these documents contained canonical suspensions or other expressions of canonical rejection of the hierarchies and of the presence of grace in church life on the other side of the division. In connection with this, it is proposed that when the above Act is put into effect, all previous acts which would hinder the fullness of canonical communion are declared invalid.
In addition, on the question of the relationship between the Church and state it becomes clear that the "Basic Social Concept" of the Russian Orthodox Church, confirmed by the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000, are also accepted by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia as a document which faithfully reflects the teachings of the Church regarding her relationship with the state and society. Documents of individual hierarchs and organs of ecclesiastical authority issued in the period of the Church under conditions totalitarian rule antagonistic to the Church both in the Fatherland and abroad which do not express the true voice of the Church of Christ are deemed no longer valid or not in effect. Having been dictated by extreme circumstances, they cannot be viewed as possessing the ecclesiastical norm. Among the documents recognized as such are for instance: "Epistle to the Clergy and Flock" (the so-called "Declaration") of 1927 and the Paschal Epistle of the First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia of 1942.
Further clarifications with regard to the "Epistle to the Clergy and Flock" were given by the Commissions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia in their "Commentary" on the Joint Document "On the Relationship between the Church and State."
The Commissions took into account that the Hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia of November 17, 2004, addressed the so-called "Synod in Resistance" in Greece with a proposal for them to normalize relations with their Local Churches. To date, a positive response to this letter has not been received. However, in a letter from the "Synod in Resistance" dated October 24, 2004, it is stated that actual canonical communion with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia had already ceased and cannot be restored while the path of peacemaking with the Moscow Patriarchate continues. The final settlement of this question is expected before the enactment of the Act on Canonical Communion.
During the joint sessions, a preliminary examination was made of the matter of the status of clergymen who moved from one jurisdiction to another while under canonical suspension. With the aim of further resolving this problem and presenting proposals to the Hierarchies, a special Subcommission was formed whose work is continuing.
The Commissions recognized that the reestablishment of full unity of the organizational structures of the Russian Orthodox Church outside of her canonical territory is a desirable goal which should be pursued. Still, the historical realities developed through the long separation must be taken into account. For this reason, in the aim of further establishing the life of a single Russian Church, it is necessary to apply proper oikonomia and pastoral discretion, gradually developing pastoral cooperation in the countries of the Russian diaspora with the special oversight of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.
The Commissions propose that the same spirit of oikonomia and pastoral discretion be used to develop a canonically-just decision of the matter of the dioceses and parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia situated on the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate. Such a decision is viewed as one of the conditions of reestablishing Eucharistic communion and the canonical unity within a single Local Russian Orthodox Church.
2. On the Attitude of the Orthodox Church towards the Heterodox and Towards Inter-Confessional Organizations
The Russian Orthodox Church strictly adheres to the teaching set forth in the Creed that the Church of Christ is one.
As the Body of Christ and the sole vessel of salvation, as the pillar and foundation of truth, the Church never divided itself nor disappeared, but always, over the entire history of Christianity, taught the pure teaching of the Gospel in the abundance of the grace-filled gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Having received the command from the Lord Jesus Christ Himself, the Church is called upon to fulfill her Apostolic mission "to preach the Gospel to every creature" (Mark 16:15). For this reason, over the course of her thousand-year history, the Russian Church illuminated with the light of the Truth of Christ both those peoples among whom she was found and those of neighboring countries. At the same time, she strove to return into the salvific bosom of the Church the separated Christians of other confessions, and with this goal, in the 19th century, created special committees for dialog with them, taking into account at the same time the various degrees of their distance from the faith and practices of the Ancient Church. Up until the 1960's, in hopes that their participation in inter-confessional meetings might encourage the study of Orthodoxy by Christians of other confessions, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia sent their representatives to such gatherings. The aims of such participation were expressed in a decision of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia on December 18/31, 1931:
"Preserving faith in the One, Holy, Universal and Apostolic Church, the Synod of Bishops affirms that the Church never divided itself. The question lies only in who belongs to her and who does not. At the same time, the Synod of Bishops fervently welcomes all attempts of the heterodox to study Christ's teaching on the Church in the hope that through this study, especially with the participation of representatives of the Holy Orthodox Church, they will ultimately come to the conclusion that the Orthodox Church, as the pillar and ground of the truth (1 Timothy 3:15), fully and without error preserved the teaching handed down by Christ the Savior to His disciples."
Still, a significant portion of the Protestant world in the course of its development embarked upon the path of humanist liberalism and is losing its bond with the Tradition of the Holy Church more and more, changing by whim the divinely-established norms of morality and dogmatic teachings and placing itself at the service of the interests of the consumerist society, subjecting themselves to notions of earthly comfort and political goals. As "salt that lost its savour" (Matthew 5:13), such communities have lost their power to resist human passions and sins.
Such tendencies evoke profound anxiety, and have motivated the Orthodox Church to re-examine its relationship with various confessions and inter-confessional organizations. The Inter-Orthodox Conference in Thessaloniki (1998) was convened in part to address this question. The practice of inter-confessional relationships was subjected to intense examination in the "Basic Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church's Attitude to the Non-Orthodox" adopted at the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church (2000). It is recognized that if the aforementioned negative tendencies reign in inter-confessional organizations, the Orthodox will be obliged to withdraw from them. For this reason, a resolution must be found in the nearest future to the problem of the degree to which existing forms of inter-Christian cooperation permit Orthodox representatives to remain free of those attitudes and participation in those practices which contradict the spirit of Orthodoxy. A condition of the participation of the Orthodox Church in inter-confessional organizations, including the World Council of Churches, is the exclusion of religious syncretism. Orthodox Christians insist on their right to freely confess their faith in the Orthodox Church as the One Holy Universal and Apostolic Church without conceding the so-called "branch theory" and definitively reject any attempts to dilute Orthodox ecclesiology.
The Orthodox Church excludes any possibility of liturgical communion with the non-Orthodox. In particular, it is considered impermissible for Orthodox to participate in liturgical actions connected with so-called ecumenical or inter-confessional religious services. In general, the Church should determine the forms of interaction with the heterodox on a conciliar basis, stemming from its teachings, canonical discipline and ecclesiastical expediency.
Nonetheless, the possibility of cooperation with the heterodox is not excluded, for example, in helping the unfortunate and by defending the innocent, in joint resistance to immorality, and in participating in charitable and educational projects. It may be appropriate to participate in socially meaningful ceremonies in which other confessions are represented. In addition, dialog with the non-Orthodox remains necessary to witness Orthodoxy to them, to overcome prejudices and to disprove false opinions. Yet it is not proper to smooth over or obscure the actual differences between Orthodoxy and other confessions.
3. On the Relationship between the Church and State
In Orthodox tradition a concept was developed of symphony between ecclesiastical and civil authority as the ideal form of the relationship between the Church and state. This symphony presumes conditions for the Church and the faithful to practice church life freely, which leads the faithful to eternal salvation, "that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty" (1 Timothy 2:2).
Since, in the words of God, "the whole world lieth in wickedness" (1 John 5:19), the ideal of such a symphony was never fully reached in reality. As a result of the Petrine reforms, the symphony was in effect replaced by a system of governmental ecclesiology, under which the state deprived the Church of full independence.
In the 20th century, after the Bolshevik revolution, unprecedented persecution of the Church in Russia began. During those years, through Divine Providence, the Russian Church produced a great host of Holy New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia. Not everyone withstood during the years of persecution. Some clergymen and laypersons, trampling upon Divine truth, facilitated the persecutors in their actions directed towards the destruction of the Church. Such actions cannot under any circumstances be permitted and justified; they deserve all condemnation, to avoid their repetition in case the Lord allows persecutions to resume.
Various approaches to the understanding of the relationship between the Church and state arose under the conditions of persecution. Some people of the Church deemed it necessary to choose the path of compromise with the state hostile towards the Church for the sake of preserving ecclesiastical structures in order to openly serve the people of God.
Others rejected this path. In the end, both were subjected to brutal repressions. These two approaches were reflected in the sorrowful divisions in the Russian Church, which gradually faded away in the following decades.
Taking into account the bitter experience of the Church in the 20th century, and based on the witness of the New Martyrs, it is necessary to define what is permissible and what is impermissible in the relationship between the Church and state, especially a state which pursues the goal of the utter destruction of the Church and the faith of Christ. Orthodox Christians came to a clear understanding of the inadmissibility of the absolutisation of government authority. It is unacceptable, in particular, to use the texts of Holy Scripture (for example, Romans 13:1-5) in a way which does not correspond with the interpretation and spirit of the Holy Fathers. Earthly and temporal powers of the state are recognized as imperative to the degree that they are used to support good and limit evil.
The relationship between the Church and state is extensively discussed in a document crucial for the self-understanding of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, the "Encyclical Epistle of the Council of Bishops Abroad" of 1933:
"While the Church exists on earth, it remains closely bound to the fates of human society and cannot be viewed as being outside of space and time. It is impossible for it to refrain from all contact with a powerful social organization such as the government; otherwise it would have to leave the world. The attempt to delineate spheres of influence between the Church and the State - the soul of man belongs to the former, his body to the latter - will in principle, of course, never achieve its objective, because it is only possible to divide man into two separate parts in an abstract sense; in reality, they comprise a single, indivisible whole, and only death dissolves the tie that binds them together. Therefore, the principle of separating the Church from the State will also never be fully realized in real life."
The Jubilee Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church of 2000 also spoke out on this matter in its "Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church:"
"In everything that exclusively concerns the earthly order of things, the Orthodox Christian is obliged to obey the law, regardless of how ideal or imperfect it is. However, when compliance with legal requirements threatens his eternal salvation and requires an act of apostasy or the commitment of some other definite sin before God and neighbour, the Christian is called upon to perform the feat of witness of the faith for the sake of Divine truth and the salvation of his soul for eternal life. He must speak openly and lawfully against the indisputable violation committed by society or state against the statutes and commandments of God. If this lawful action is impossible or ineffective, he must assume the stance of civil disobedience" (IV, 9).
"The Church remains loyal to the state, but God's commandment to fulfill the task of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances supersedes this loyalty. If the authority forces Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state" (III, 5).
The Church is called upon to exert spiritual influence on the state and its citizens, to confess Christ, to defend the moral foundations of society. By interacting with the state for the good of the people, the Church, however, cannot assume civil functions for itself. The state must not interfere in the inner structure, administration or life of the Church. The Church must support all good initiatives of the state, but must resist evil, immorality and harmful social phenomena and always firmly confess the Truth, and when persecutions commence, to continue to openly witness the faith and be prepared to follow the path of confessors and martyrs for Christ.
4. Commentary on the Joint Document of the Commissions of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia Entitled "On the Relations Between Church and State"
One of the most important questions facing Church life in the 20th century was undoubtedly that of the relationship between the Church and state. Both Commissions deemed it necessary to speak out on one of the most tragic phenomena of recent church history, the conciliar recognition of which is necessary for the reestablishment of the unity of the Russian Church. This refers to the Declaration of the Deputy Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne dated July 16/29, 1927, often called the "Declaration," and also to the ecclesiastical policies which followed under conditions of the God-battling totalitarian regime.
1. Although the publication of the "Declaration" was not the only reason for the church divisions arising in the 1920's, it is undoubtedly this document which in fact served to hasten the establishment of an administrative rift between the Church in Russia and its émigré part outside of her borders. It became for many the beginning of a spiritual separation.
2. The "Declaration" was written under unprecedented pressure from the militantly atheistic state, which threatened to completely eliminate all legal forms of church life. His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia said the following as early as 1991:
"Today we can say that there is untruth mixed into... the Declaration. The Declaration placed for itself the goal of placing the Church in the proper relationship with the Soviet state. But this relationship - and in the Declaration it was clearly defined as the subjugation of the Church to the interests of government politics - is incorrect from the point of view of the Church."[1]
3. The ecclesiastical policies of Metropolitan Sergius were doubtless aimed towards the preservation of the church hierarchy, which was the target of destruction by the militant atheists, and also aimed towards the possibility of administering the Mysteries.
The passage of time showed that communities refusing communion with the church hierarchy headed by Metropolitan Sergius were deprived of the possibility of survival under persecution, and those remnants that did survive could not openly confess Christ's teachings and influence the spiritual life of the people. After the Church Council of 1945, a significant portion of the "non-commemorating" clergy and laity entered the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. Among those who remained separated from communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, the danger arose of veering into sectarianism.
4. The policies of Metropolitan Sergius enabled the reestablishment of church life during and after the Second World War.
The patriotic stance expressed in part in the "Declaration" resonated in the hearts of many members of the Russian Orthodox during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Orthodox Christians fought and struggled for the good of their homeland, as did Great Martyr George the Victory-bearer, St Theodore Stratilatos, and many holy warriors in the first centuries of Christianity, who fought to defend their pagan countries, as did St John the Damascene, who laboured to benefit his country, then under Muslim control.
The activity of the bishops and pastors of the Russian Orthodox Church during the years of World War II, blessing the people in their self-sacrifice in the battle against fascism, became a shining example of the fulfilment of Christian and patriotic duty. Also recognizing the terrible danger of German Nazism were the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, who also suffered grief from the tragic fate that befell the Russian people. It is known that Archbishop John (Maximovich), who was included among the host of saints by the Russian Church Abroad, while beyond the reach of the godless regime, performed services of supplication for the victory of his Fatherland, and made monetary collections for the needs of the troops in action.
5. The publication of the "Declaration" did not mean that the Church was of one mind with the ideology of the atheist state. An attempt was made in the document to express what the Church had stated since the first centuries of her history, from the time of the Apostles and her apologists: Christians are not enemies of the state. Still, for the godless state, Orthodox Christians remained unreliable and alien even after the publication of the "Declaration."
At the same time, the "Declaration" introduced a sharp rift within the people of the Church. There are known instances when during the interrogation of the "non-commemorating" clergymen, the persecutors of the Church referred to the "Declaration." It was then, and is to this day, a temptation for many children of the Russian Orthodox Church.
6. Over the course of the two-thousand-year-old history of the Church, such compromises under conditions of persecution are known. But never did those people who made compromises for the sake of preserving the legal existence of the Church, nor, of course, those who disagreed with such a policy, ever deem the path of compromise as normal, as the only path or the as natural path of the Church of Christ.
7. The martyrs and confessors who gave their lives for Christ and His Church were numerous, both among those who accepted the "Declaration" and among those who rejected it. From among one group and another, many are now among the host of saints. The actions of Metropolitan Sergius, which spurred and continue to spur so many arguments, were without a doubt dictated by the search for a way to preserve church life in the coming crucial epoch, in difficult circumstances theretofore unseen.
"The tragedy of Metropolitan Sergius lies in the fact that he attempted in earnest to reach an agreement with criminals who had wrested power."[2]
8. Both in the part of the Russian Church found abroad, and, what is very important, inside Russia as well, the "Declaration" was viewed by the people of the Church as a morbid, tragic compromise, but not as the free voice of the Church of Christ.
9. Certain chapters of a document adopted at the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (August 2000), formulated in complete agreement with the teachings of the Church and the Holy Fathers on the relationship of the Church and the civil authorities, were soon afterwards given a positive evaluation by the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (October 2000).
"The Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church," in a series of theses,[3] clearly defines the principles of the ecclesiastical approach to the relationship of the Church and state. In part, it says that the Church under certain circumstances must call for civil disobedience. The "Concept" contains ideas which differ in principle from those expressed in the "Declaration."
In comparing the "Declaration" and the "Basic Social Concept," Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad noted at the Council of Bishops of October 2004:
"The free voice of the Church, speaking with particular clarity in this conciliar document ["Concept"], gives us the opportunity to look upon the "Declaration" in a new way. While understanding that the path chosen in 1927 on the relationship towards the state was motivated by the desire to preserve the possibility for the Church to exist legally, this path was authoritatively deemed inconsistent with the genuine norms of Church-state relations by the Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. The epoch of the imprisonment of the Church has come to an end."
In this way, the "Declaration" was seen as a coerced document which did not express the free will of the Church.
At the same time, a critical view of the above document does not equate to a condemnation of His Holiness Patriarch Sergius, and does not express an effort to besmirch his person and mitigate his First-Hierarchical service in the difficult years of the Church's life in the Soviet Union.
As His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II said in 1991, "The Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius has departed into the past, and we are not guided by it."[4]
The rejection of the course of the Russian Church in her relations with the state as reflected in the "Declaration" opens the path to the fullness of brotherly communion.
DECR MP (www.mospat.ru)
L'Eglise orthodoxe russe préoccupée par l'avenir de la Russie
par Olga Sobolevskaïa, commentatrice de RIA Novosti
La longévité moyenne en Russie n'est que de 65 ans et les effectifs de la population fondent à la vitesse d'un million d'âmes chaque année."Nous sommes désormais placés devant un choix qui déterminera si notre patrie existera ou non dans l'avenir, a déclaré le Patriarche Alexis II devant la conférence consacrée à l'assise spirituelle et morale du développement démographique de la Russie. Depuis quinze ans la mortalité en Russie prend le pas sur la natalité. A l'heure qu'il est, la population russe n'est plus que de 144,2 millions de personnes, ce qui est extrêmement peu au vu des dimensions du pays. Les spécialistes du Centre de démographie et d'écologie de l'homme (CDEH) relevant de l'Académie des sciences de Russie comparent les pertes de la Russie causées par l'augmentation de la mortalité dans tous les groupes d'âge à celles subies en temps de guerre. La mortalité progresse parmi la population active, l'année dernière plus de 233.000 personnes sont décédées prématurément. La longévité moyenne des hommes en Russie est seulement de 58-59 ans (ce qui situe le pays à la 134-e place dans le monde), celle des femmes est de 72 ans (100-e place). Parmi les principales causes de la mortalité on trouve l'alcoolisme, la toxicomanie ainsi que les maladies et les accidents qu'ils provoquent. Toutefois, Vladimir Poutine estime que ces causes "ne sont qu'un résultat de la récession économique, de la dégradation du secteur social, du bas niveau de vie et de l'isolement d'avec les principaux centres politiques, économiques et culturels du pays". Selon lui, pour donner un coup d'arrêt à la baisse de la population il faut en premier lieu "développer l'économie et le secteur social", a dit le chef de l'Etat en conclusion.
Pour le Patriarche de Moscou et de toutes les Russies la raison première de la crise démographique est "la mauvaise santé spirituelle de la nation, l'abandon des hautes valeurs morales". "La Russie a traversé des périodes bien plus difficiles sur le plan économique, mais, moralement solides, les gens voyaient dans la famille une valeur indéniable et, en dépit des difficultés, ils avaient beaucoup d'enfants et faisaient grand cas de leur éducation", a dit Alexis II dans son intervention devant la conférence.
L'église, les sociologues et les milieux publics voient dans les valeurs familiales un remède efficace contre la "maladie" démographique. Ces valeurs, elles ont beaucoup été discréditées en Russie par ce que l'on appelle la "Deuxième révolution démographique" importée d'Occident à l'aube des années 1990. Ses "conquêtes" sont la crise de la famille, la multiplication des unions libres et des avortements. De plus en plus souvent les femmes s'emploient à faire carrière avant d'avoir des enfants. Si bien que le taux de natalité en Russie est l'un des plus bas d'Europe: 1,25 naissance par femme alors qu'il en faudrait 2,2. "Nous pouvons atteindre le "point de non-retour" au-delà duquel il ne sera plus possible de reconstituer la population", dit Alexandre Tchouev, vice-président du Comité de la Douma (chambre basse du parlement russe) pour les associations et les organisations religieuses. Au demeurant, les représentants de l'église font remarquer que les grands moyens d'information prônent "le laisser-aller, l'égoïsme, le culte de la violence et l'abandon de la morale" et que de nombreux couples renoncent à avoir des enfants "par souci de confort immédiat".
Le chef de l'Eglise orthodoxe russe souligne qu'il ne doit pas y avoir d'orphelins restés sans tutelle, qu'il est nécessaire de soutenir les familles nombreuses et celles qui adoptent des enfants, d'inculquer aux jeunes "le désir de fonder une famille". "Tout ce qui contribue à la consolidation de la famille doit faire l'objet de toute l'attention de l'Eglise, de l'Etat et de la société, dit le Patriarche avec conviction.
Selon le ministre russe de la Santé et du développement social, Mikhaïl Zourabov, la situation démographique devrait être améliorée, entre autres, par le programme de crédit-logement hypothécaire. Dans certaines régions, en Bachkirie et en Oudmourtie, par exemple, d'ores et déjà on "efface" partiellement la "dette" logement des jeunes ménages dès qu'ils ont des enfants. Ils bénéficient également d'avantages fiscaux.
Plusieurs régions - Centre, Volga, Sibérie - ont introduit des stimulants économiques de la natalité et en complément des allocations ponctuelles de naissance (4.500 roubles versés par l'employeur, 2.000 roubles par la municipalité, plus 500 roubles mensuels par enfant ; le dollar s'échange contre environ 29 roubles) une "prime" est versée pour la progéniture. A Moscou les parents de moins de 30 ans touchent 16.000 roubles pour leur premier enfant, 32.000 pour le troisième. Leurs homologues pétersbourgeois en reçoivent 8.000. Dans de nombreuses villes les jeunes parents sont assistés dans la recherche d'un emploi. Il y a aussi le Programme fédéral finalisé "Enfants de Russie" et son volet "Enfant sain". A Saint-Pétersbourg, à Kostroma, à Vologda, à Tioumen, à Sakhalinsk, à Iékaterinbourg, à Perm et à Sourgout cette aide s'est traduite par une augmentation de 7 pour cent du nombre des naissances. Le gouvernement a élaboré un programme pour les quatre années à venir, comportant des mesures visant la croissance économique, l'amélioration du secteur social et de la situation démographique, avait déclaré le vice-premier ministre, Alexandre Joukov, dès le mois de juin.
Les spécialistes du Centre de démographie et d'écologie de l'homme relevant de l'Académie des sciences de Russie ajoutent que pour parvenir à une croissance démographique optimale il faut relever sensiblement les crédits pour la santé, l'écologie et la vulgarisation d'un mode de vie sain. Il faut modifier "tout le climat social de la vie quotidienne", estiment les chercheurs pour résumer.
Bischof von Wien und Österreich Hilarion: Die Orthodoxie vor der Herausforderung des militanten Säkularismus
Der militante Säkularismus wird in seinem Kampf gegen die Religion vor allem durch ein antikatholisches Pathos beflügelt. Hauptsächlich die Katholische Kirche setzt sich daher ihrerseits gegen den Säkularismus und Liberalismus in Europa zur Wehr. Aber auf dem europäischen Kontinent leben auch eine bedeutende Anzahl von Protestanten und nicht weniger als 200 Millionen Orthodoxe. Die Antwort vieler europäischer Protestanten auf die Herausforderung des Säkularismus ist leider ein allmähliches Abrücken von den grundlegenden theologischen und moralischen Normen des Christentums, eine Aushöhlung der Prinzipien der Glaubenslehre und Moral, ihre Anpassung an die säkulare Weltanschauung. Was wird die Antwort der Orthodoxen Kirche auf diese Herausforderung sein? Und wer sind die Hauptverbündeten der Orthodoxen Kirche im Kampf um das Recht, sein Leben auf Grundlage der Priorität der traditionellen Werte vor den „allgemeinmenschlichen“ Werten einzurichten?
Ich bin zutiefst davon überzeugt, dass in Europa die Katholische Kirche der Hauptverbündete der Orthodoxen Kirche ist. Jene Probleme, die heute in den Beziehungen zwischen Katholiken und Orthodoxen in der Ukraine und in Russland bestehen, müssen natürlich gelöst werden., aber diese Probleme müssen lokal beschränkt werden, indem man sie der Kompetenz spezieller bilateraler Kommissionen überträgt. Was den europäischen gesellschaftlichen Bereich betrifft, müssen hier Orthodoxe und Katholiken gemeinsame Wege des Zeugnisses angesichts einer entkirchlichten Welt finden.
In vielen Punkten sind auch die Vertreter anderer traditioneller Religionen, im Besonderen des Islams und des Judentums, unsere Verbündeten in der Verteidigung der traditionellen Werte. Als Frankreich das Verbot des Tragens religiöser Symbole in Schulen und an öffentlichen Orten verhängte, fielen unter dieses Verbot „große und augenfällige religiöse Attribute“ wie Kopftuch, Kippa und große christliche Kreuze. Der vor allem gegen Muslime gerichtete Schlag traf die Vertreter aller drei monotheistischen Religionen. Und nicht zufällig solidarisierten sich in diesem Fall die christlichen Führer Frankreichs mit den Vertretern des Judentums und des Islams. Die Erweiterung des interreligiösen Dialogs gewinnt im Kontext dieser Ereignisse eine besondere Aktualität.
Bis vor kurzem war der Einfluss der Orthodoxie auf die europäischen Prozesse ziemlich beschränkt. In Ländern mit einer katholischen oder protestantischen Bevölkerungsmehrheit war die Orthodoxie der breiten Öffentlichkeit wenig bekannt; gesellschaftlich spielte sie auf nationaler wie auf europäischer Ebene keine merkbare Rolle. Diese Situation wird sich wahrscheinlich nach dem Beitritt von Staaten mit orthodoxer Tradition – wie Bulgariens, Rumäniens und Zyperns – zur Europäischen Union verändern. Zusammen mit Griechenland, das seit 1974 Mitglied der Europäischen Union ist, zusammen mit den Baltischen Staaten und anderen europäischen Ländern, wo eine zahlenmäßig bedeutende orthodoxe Minderheit lebt, werden diese Staaten jene „orthodoxe Lobby“ bilden, die über genügend Einfluss verfügen wird, um mit den europäischen politischen Einrichtungen einen vollwertigen Dialog führen zu können. Es ist wichtig, dass an diesem Dialog neben den Politikern auch die Vertreter der Orthodoxen Kirche der erwähnten Länder teilnehmen.
Ein solcher Dialog ist derzeit äußerst notwendig, da das orthodoxe Christentum neben dem Katholizismus nicht selten betroffen ist, wenn man versucht, ihm säkulare Normen aufzuerlegen. Zu Beginn des Jahres 2003 stimmte das Europäische Parlament für die Abschaffung des Verbots des Zutritts von Frauen auf den Heiligen Berg Athos mit der Begründung, dass dieses Verbot das „universal anerkannte Prinzip der Gleichheit der Geschlechter“ sowie die Gesetze über den freien Personenverkehr aller Bürger der Europäischen Union auf ihrem Territorium verletze. In dieser Resolution äußerte sich die vollkommene Unempfindsamkeit der europäischen Politiker in Bezug auf den besonderen Status des Athos als einer orthodoxen Mönchsrepublik, wo das erwähnte Verbot schon tausend Jahre existiert. Die europäischen Abgeordneten beunruhigt es nicht, dass die Abschaffung einer viele Jahrhunderte langen Tradition unausweichlich zur Zerstörung der tausendjährigen Struktur des athonitischen Mönchtums führen würde: Für sie ist nur die Kongruenz oder Nicht-Kongruenz der einen oder anderen religiösen Gemeinschaft mit den von ihnen selbst aufgestellten Normen von Belang.
Die Orthodoxe Kirche besteht auf der religiös-weltanschaulichen Neutralität der weltlichen Macht (Die Grundlagen der Sozialkonzeption der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche III.6) und auf der Unzulässigkeit der Einmischung des Staates in das innere Leben der Kirche (Ebd. III.3). Die Kirche ruft die weltliche Macht dazu auf, ihre innere Verfassung zu achten, und ist gleichzeitig bereit, mit dem weltlichen Staat unter der Bedingung der Absenz eines staatlichen Diktats im öffentlichen Wirken der Kirche in jenen Angelegenheiten zusammenzuarbeiten, die dem Wohl der Kirche, der Person und der Gesellschaft dienen (Ebd. III.8). Die Kirche achtet das Prinzip der Weltlichkeit des Staates, aber hält es für unzulässig, dieses Prinzip als „radikale Verdrängung der Religion aus allen Bereichen des Lebens des Volkes“, als „Ausschluss der religiösen Gemeinschaften von der Teilnahme an der Lösung gesellschaftlich relevanter Aufgaben“ zu verstehen (Ebd. III.3).
Leider verstehen jene europäischen Politiker, die sich bemühen, die traditionelle Kirchenstruktur zu zerstören, indem sie die Kirche aus der Sphäre der Öffentlichkeit verdrängen, das Prinzip der Weltlichkeit des Staates eben in dieser Weise. Und gegen eine solche Auffassung müssen die Orthodoxen Kirchen kämpfen und ihre Bemühungen mit all jenen vereinen, die heute bereit sind, die traditionellen Werten gegen die liberalen, die religiösen Werte gegen die „allgemeinmenschlichen“ Werte zu verteidigen, und die bereit sind, sich für das Recht der Religionen auf gesellschaftliche Äußerung einzusetzen. Die traditionellen religiösen Konfessionen werden den Ansturm des militanten Säkularismus nur dann abwenden können, wenn sie in einer Front auftreten.
Letters to the Editor
Bishop Hilarion's recent statement calling for "a European Catholic-Orthodox Alliance" to be formed has provoked very great interest. It is worth reflecting exactly upon the Bishop's words: "This alliance may enable European Catholics and Orthodox to fight together against secularism, liberalism and relativism prevailing in modern Europe, may help them to speak with one voice in addressing secular society, may provide for them an ample space where they will discuss modern issues and come to common positions."
An alliance is not a union between Churches and Bishop Hilarion expressed himself quite clearly upon this point. However, whilst the matter of union between the Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church still has serious doctrinal obstacles, there is every reason to suppose that an alliance of the kind defined above will not only attain its purpose of resisting militant secularism and fighting for Christian values in the European context of legislation but also bring the two Churches closer, producing, as all practical co-operation does, an attitude of mutual sensitivity and respect. Practical co-operation is worth much more than agreed statements: the latter have an abstract quality, whilst the former is something that every one can grasp concretely.
More controversially Bishop Hilarion says: "By defending life, marriage and procreation, by struggling against legalization of contraception, abortion and euthanasia, against recognition of homosexual unions as equal to marital ones, against libertinage in all forms, Catholics and Orthodox are engaged in a battle for survival of the European civilization, of European peoples, of Europe as such."
The mention of "contraception" along with abortion, euthanasia, & homosexual unions has provoked some adverse comment from the more middle-class wing of the Western Orthodox Church. The problem arises from memory of Pope Paul VI's encyclical Humanae Vitae [1968], which declared contraception to be gravely sinful and from the crisis that this reassertion of the moral tradition of Roman Catholic doctrine produced in Europe, the UK and the USA. At the time of Paul VI's pontificate there were great hopes amongst the more liberal circles of Roman Catholicism that the Church would relax its teaching in this specific area, in view of the majority report which gave a favourable answer to the question of whether contraception was licit.
Historically, the moment of Pope Paul VI's rejection of the majority report, his re-examination of the whole question from the point of view of his own office and his final decision that there would be no change in the official Catholic Church teaching had some important consequences. Firstly, it produced a polarization between Vatican authority and Catholic dissent upon this issue. Hans Küng began his book Infallible? with a discussion of whether or not the encyclical was an infallible dogmatic definition, in view of the fact that the Roman Catholic Church believes that the Pope may be infallible "on faith and morals." It now seems clear that the encyclical was not a pronouncement of the infallible teaching office of the Pope as was for example, quite unequivocally, Pope Pius XII's definition in 1950 of the Assumption of the Mother of God "body and soul" into heaven. Secondly and simultaneously, it began an uncompromising battle with liberal attitudes concerning sexuality, the propagation of life and the preservation of innocent lives which is associated especially with the pontificate of John Paul II.
There is no reason why the Orthodox Church should associate itself with the authority-questions connected with the Roman Catholic Church's position in the modern world, which have a history going back into the 19th century, when the Papacy reacted against modernity by developing further the unique and supernatural nature of its office. At the same time, the profoundly personal and humane nature of Pope John Paul's struggle on behalf both of the dignity of every human life and the sacredness of the means by which human life comes into existence is something which, as Orthodox, we can identify ourselves. Moreover, Pope Paul VI's Humanae Vitae was much more than an assertion of authority. There are many general principles in this document which Orthodoxy shares. Pope Paul VI was well aware of the difficulty of living a Christian married life in the modern world; with regard to those who felt unable to comply with the ideal he upheld, Pope Paul did not condemn them but urged them to stay in the Church, to confess their shortcomings and to benefit from the grace provided by the sacraments. It is this sense that human beings are in constant need of grace that scandalised the optimistic liberalism of the late 1960s.
The Orthodox Church does not have a magisterium or official teaching body, by which definitions may be promulgated nor, of course, does it accord to any Patriarchate the authority as a centre of unity which the Roman See claims as having received from St Peter. We, therefore, do not have an official pronouncement upon the subject of contraception of comparable authority with Humanae Vitae. It does not follow from this that there are not aspects of the Roman Catholic teaching on the subject of contraception that the Orthodox Church does not share. The vital affinity which we have with the Roman Catholic Church is the high sense of the dignity of marriage as the sharing with God in the propagation of life. In that God has called those who are married to participate in the miracle of conception, He has called us to be like Him and to represent Him in the world as a sign to the nations. Consequently, as Orthodox we cannot be on the side of the active and often aggressive promulgation, through education, and through public health-policies, of artificial contraception which interferes with the process by which human life comes to be. This is because these public policies are part of the very secularism which we resist, insisting in an unbalanced way upon contraception as the solution to conceptions described as "unwanted" and educating people into an outlook in which chastity has no part. In fact contraception has been advanced as a panacea but the many abortions show that it has not been effective in preventing the murders of innocents: whilst the programmes of education about contraception might have been expected to reduce the number of abortions, the reverse has been the case. Such programmes cannot substitute for the respect for the holiness of sex within marriage, which Christian teaching says can only be attained by the grace that enables us to overcome the disordered passions which all human beings suffer as a result of their fallen condition.
I conclude that, although we have reservations about how the contraception-issue has got mixed up with the absolutism of the papal office, we do not, on the other hand, recommend contraception as a positive good or a praiseworthy actualization of human freedom.
Stephen Thomas,
Southampton, UK